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Abstract: Through financial network analysis we ascertain the existence of important
causal behavior among certain financial assets, as inferred by eight different causality
methods. To our knowledge this is the first extensive comparative analysis of financial
networks as produced by various causality methods. Additionally, some specific non-
linear causalities are used for the first time in the financial network research. Our results
contradict the Efficient Market Hypothesis and open new horizons for further investi-
gation and possible arbitrage opportunities. Moreover, we find some evidence that two
of the causality methods used, at least to some extent, could warn us about the financial
crisis of 2007-2009. Furthermore, we test the similarity percentage of the eight causality
methods and we find that the most similar pair of causality-induced networks is on av-
erage less than 50% similar throughout the time period examined, rendering thus the
comparability and substitutability among those causality methods rather dubious. We
also rank the assets in terms of overall out-strength centrality and we find that there is
an underlying bonds regime almost monopolising in some cases the realm of causality.
Finally, using the network visualization, we observe an established pattern (i.e., across
all causalities) of oil’s rising role as the financial network faces the Chinese stock market
crash.
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1 Introduction
In the dawn of the 21st century, we faced a financial maelstrom that had such a global im-
pact, rippling stock markets across countries like a cataclysmic domino. This so-called global
financial crisis of 2007-2009 still echoes in traders, scientists as well as laymen' minds, shook
the very foundations of traditional economics and forecasting methods; both of which not
only failed to prevent, but also failed to predict the calamity to come. One possible expla-
nation of such a failure could be the fact that traditional economics focus in the “isolated”
analysis of individual financial assets, e.g. market indices, bonds, stocks and commodities.
By isolated here we mean disconnected from their kindred, i.e., ignoring their interactions
with other financial assets. Nonetheless, there are many reasons to defy the bias for dis-
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connection among assets. First of all, assets are more often than not traded in groups, or
portfolios, containing at least a dozen of them which are subject to a common strategy. In
fact, portfolios of assets are the norm against single asset trading. This common trading
pattern suggests that the selling and buying orders of some bundles of assets are governed
by the same person (or a small group of people), thus they are to some extent interrelated.
Secondly, if we think of the assets’ prices as financial embodiments of companies (equities,
bonds), national governments (sovereign bonds) and essential market products (commodi-
ties), one cannot neglect the causal interactions among them. For example, an increase in
oil prices can cause a decrease in airlines services demand, a disruptive innovation in tele-
coms industry can be patented and turn the tables in the market share of the competitors;
not to mention that an increase in the rates of government bonds directly impacts the stock
market investments. Last but definitely not least, the psychology of people involved in a
specific (national) stock market may at least partly be affected by the fluctuations of stock
markets in other countries, e.g. the news of a stock market crash can cause overwhelming
sentiments of fear and panic beyond the national bounds, thus impacting the international
big game. Reckoning up to that, the cases of large capitalization international funds that
invest in many stock markets, and we have more than enough reasons to put under scrutiny
the causality among financial assets.
Causality is the relationship between a variable (the cause), whose past performance
influences the future output of another variable (the effect) (Pearl, 2003). Scientists from
various disciplines have developed methods to quantify causality in time series, despite the
fact that not all of them use the term “causality” exclusively. In this paper, we shall use
a collection of eight causality methods. Statisticians, by evolving the notion of correlation,
introduced the methods of linear intertemporal cross correlation (Hawawini, 1980) and non-
linear intertemporal cross correlation (Pijn et al, 1989) in their endeavor to quantify lead-lag
relationships among time series. Econometricians driven by the need to quantify common
integrated behavior in time series developed the methods of linear (Granger, 1981) and non-
linear cointegration (Granger and Hallman, 1991). Moreover, the known index of Granger
causality, both in its linear (Granger, 1969) and nonlinear (Hiemstra and Jones, 1994) form,
was established in the field of econometrics as well. Lastly physicists, mostly from the disci-
pline of information theory, introduced the indices of shadow correlation (Granger and Lin,
1994) and transfer entropy (Schreiber, 2000) that quantify in a model-free way relationships
between variables. We use the eight aforementioned methods in order to capture with each
one of them the evolution of average causality in a financial network of assets, consisting
of various national market indices, sovereign bonds and oil prices, in the period engulfing
before, during and after the global financial crisis.
1.1 Motivation
Our motivation to delve into the realm of causality in financial assets is threefold. On the
one hand, we feel committed to examine the possibility of causality being able to serve as
an early warning signal of the systemic financial collapse. On the other hand, we are also
interested to explore whether or not any arbitrage opportunities arise through for example
persistent and strong causal relationships between assets. Lastly, we are intrigued to put
under scrutiny the less explored and more vestal (as compared to correlations) discipline of
causalities in financial networks.
Our choice of assets from various national markets and not from an individual stock
market is not random. Given that we settled to study the evolution of causality throughout
the global financial crisis we choose both indices and bonds from countries most represen-
tative of the turmoil that ensued. Specifically, we choose market indices from USA, China,
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Brazil, Germany, France, Japan, Hong Kong, Australia and India given that they are coun-
tries with large stock market capitalization. For government bonds, we choose those of USA,
UK, Germany, Japan, Australia, Switzerland, Spain, Italy and Greece, because we consider
those governments as the ones most involved or affected by the crisis. We also include oil
prices in our analysis, a commodity strong enough to cause a crisis on its own, as in the case
of the 1973 oil crisis. The period we choose for analysis (2000-2016) demands in itself data
from various countries given that the extensive use of the web and social media has enabled
the international transmission of stock market news and shocks faster than ever before. We
believe that our study is an attempt to study a significant portion of the global financial sys-
tem during a period involving extreme disorder, via the lenses of multidisciplinary causality
methods.
1.2 Results
We study the evolutionary behavior of the average causality lying in our financial network.
This analysis is conducted for each of the eight causality methods displayed in this paper.
Our results ascertain the existence of significant causal behavior among assets throughout
the time period examined. According to Hawawini (1980), Atkinson et al. (1987), Lo and
Mackinlay (1990), Chowdhury (1991) and Fiedor (2014) the very existence of causality in
financial assets challenges the foundations of the well-known Efficient Market Hypothesis
(EMH). EMH has three forms: ”weak,” ”semi-strong,” and ”strong” form. The weak form of
the EMH claims that asset prices already reflect all publicly available information. The semi-
strong form of the EMH includes the weaks form’s characteristic and also claims that prices
instantly change to reflect new public information. Finally, the strong form of the EMH ad-
ditionally claims that prices instantly reflect even hidden ”insider” information. Our results
evidently defy the EMH at least in its strong and maybe also in its semi-strong form given
that causality has to do with assimilation of not only current but also past information. We
consider for our analysis that the global crisis was born on the 9th of August in 2007 as this
is the most widespread view based on Google search. More specifically, results from linear
intertemporal cross correlation do not imply any predictive capabilities, given that the av-
erage causality as measured by it, begins to drop in parallel with the development of the
global financial crisis and not before. However, average causality as measured by nonlin-
ear intertemporal cross correlation, could be a candidate for early warning signal given that
almost half a year before the crash (on the eve of 2007) it started dropping to all-time lows,
and then immediately during the unfolding of the crisis it started rising more steeply than
ever before. Linear cointegration analysis does not produce any different causality behavior
before or during the global crisis. Its nonlinear counterpart exhibits a marked plunge just
three months before the global crisis and then again rises steeply to higher levels. Both lin-
ear and nonlinear Granger causality displayed no change in their average causality before
or during the global crisis. Despite the fact that shadow causality (based off shadow correla-
tion) displays no forecasting capabilities, it somehow fits quite characteristically on the crisis
period by displaying a dramatic drop right after the crisis birth, after a protracted upward
trend. Similarly, hidden causality (based off transfer entropy) simply changes its trend from
horizontally-fluctuating to slightly downward after the crisis emergence. Apart from the
exceptions of nonlinear intertemporal cross correlation and nonlinear cointegration, the rest
methods simply follow up the emergence of financial turbulence, serving at best as contem-
poraneous crisis indicators and not as early warning signals. However, these results can by
no means suggest that the remaining six causality methods are incapable of serving as early
warning signals, only that they need to be put to further scrutiny.
In order to assess whether or not any comparative analysis among the eight causality
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methods is meaningful, we test the similarity percentage of common links that remain in the
financial network (after filtering for the optimal links in terms of maximum spanning tree)
and find that the most similar pair of causality-induced network is that of linear intertem-
poral cross correlation and linear cointegration methods scoring 48.74% average similarity
throughout the time period examined. Thus, we consider it meaningless to try to compare
results among different causality methods, at least through our choice of filtering (maximum
spanning tree).
In order to gain portfolio-specific insights we delve to network analysis, and specifically
link persistence and asset centrality. To that end we rank the causal links as produced by
each causality method and we find that the most intense and protracted relationship across
all causality methods is that of 10Y-USA-bond causing the prices of (→ ) 2to3Y-Spanish-
bond. The latter relationship can be considered as strong candidate for arbitrage opportuni-
ties. Last but not least, we rank all (25 in total) of the financial assets under study in terms
of averaged causality emanation to the network by means of out-strength centrality, and we
find that the most causal asset overall seems to be the USA 10 year-bond. Nevertheless,
sovereign bonds ranked in general better than equities and oil especially in the case of linear
cointegration and hidden causality, unveiling a hidden regime of bonds. This result could
not be better described than in the words of James Carville, President Clinton’s political ad-
viser (2012, Arnold) who said: “I used to think that if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come
back as the president or the pope. But now I would like to come back as the bonds market. You can
intimidate everybody.”.
In Section 2, we present the formulae, literature review and significance to finance for
each of the eight causality methods. In Section 3, we provide details regarding the choice of
our dataset. In Section 4, we present our research questions and results and in Section 5, we
give our concluding remarks.
2 Causality Methodologies
In our study, causality between financial assets is the quantification of the impact that an
asset’s past price performance have on another asset’s future price parformance. Embedded
in the nature of causality is some form of predictive potential, i.e., if we know the causality
(quantified) between two assets, then given the price of the cause-asset we can, to some
extent and probabilistically speaking, forecast the effect-assets price.
2.1 Linear Intertemporal Cross Correlation
The existence of linear intertemporal cross correlation (LICC) implies that asset prices change
in a lead-lag manner and not simultaneously (Atchinson et al. 1987). LICC is also known as
lead-lag cross correlation or time-delayed cross correlation or time-dependent cross correla-
tion. Hawawini (1980) was the first researcher who implemented it in the finance literature,
and below we present the formula:
LICCxy∆t =
〈Rx∆t(t)Ry∆t(t + τ)〉 − 〈Rx∆t(t)〉〈Ry∆t(t + τ)〉√
〈[Rx∆t(t)− 〈Rx∆t(t)〉]2〉〈[Ry∆t(t + τ)− 〈Ry∆t(t + τ)〉]2〉
, (1)
where Rx∆t(t) = log[p(t)]− log[p(t− ∆t)] is the log return of the price, p(t), of an asset at
a certain time t. ∆t denotes time interval of the log returns, usually, it equals 1-time unit.
τ denotes the intertemporal delay among the two assets, and 〈Rx∆t(t)〉 denotes the mean of
Rx∆t(t), and x and y denote asset x and asset y.
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Remark 1. When τ = 0, the LICC coincides with Pearson product moment correlation
coefficient. Rx∆t(t) takes values from −1 to +1. When Rxy∆t(t) < 0, this means that asset x has
a reverse effect on asset y, i.e., if yesterday’s return on asset x increases then today’s return
on asset y shall decrease, and vice versa. When Rxy∆t(t) > 0, this means that asset x has a
same-direction effect on asset y, i.e., if yesterday’s return on asset x increases then today’s
return on asset y shall also increase. If Rxy∆t(t) = 0, this means that asset x has no effect on
asset y.
In the finance literature, there are three dominant hypotheses that try to explain the rai-
son d'eˆtre of lead-lag relationships among assets. These hypotheses are: 1) Nonsynchronous
Trading, 2) Speed of Price Adjustment Hypothesis, and 3) Stock Market Overreaction hy-
pothesis (Lo and Mackinlay 1990). Following the hypotheses behind the existence of lead-
lag effects, we found some implications regarding the realization of lead-lag effects and their
significance in terms of the well-known financial theory of the EMH. More specifically, the
existence of intertemporal cross correlations among asset returns implies deviation from the
EMH, and thus, provides a probabilistic glimpse at the future of asset prices (Atkinson et al.
1987; Lo and Mackinlay, 1990; Hawawini, 1980).
Kullmann et al. (2002) employed the LICC index to analyze a network of equities from
NYSE. They suggested that the existence of such causal relations is due to the functional
interactions between the companies that are represented from the equities in their dataset.
Mizuno et al. (2004) examined LICC in data of foreign exchange rates and pinpointed arbi-
trage opportunities for the Japanese Yen through buying it in one market and selling it in
another. Eom et al. (2008) analyzed asset prices from Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Canada and
USA and found statistically significant interactions among them. Wang et al. (2011) ana-
lyzed the network of 48 stock market indices and concluded that news regarding stock mar-
ket crashes travel beyond national boundaries impacting stock markets around the world in
a domino fashion. Huth and Abergel (2014) found important lead-lag relationships in USA
high frequency time series. Curme et al. (2015) analyzed time series of 100 NYSE equities
and located non-negligible intertemporal cross correlations suggesting possible arbitrage
opportunities.
The advantage of LICC is the fact that it captures the direction of influence among as-
set returns contrary to Pearson product moment correlation coefficient which captures just
naive correlations. However, LICC bears one disadvantage that cannot be ignored, namely it
takes into account only linear causal relationships. LICC cannot capture nonlinear causal re-
lationships. To that end we present the nonlinear intertemporal cross correlation, described
in the next section.
2.2 Nonlinear Intertemporal Cross Correlation
The inability of LICC to capture nonlinear intertemporal relations can be surpassed by em-
ploying the nonlinear intertemporal cross correlation. NICC is a statistical measure de-
veloped by Pijn et al. (1989) which quantifies nonlinear as well as linear causality from
a time series x to a time series y. They developed NICC (also known as correlation ra-
tio eta) out of need to capture nonlinear time delayed relationships in brain neuron sig-
nals. We consider the application of NICC in financial time series, since we are inter-
ested in capturing the nonlinear intertemporal relationships among assets. According to
Pijn et al. (1989), NICCxy∆t describes the contraction in uncertainty of R
y
∆t(t + τ) that can
be achieved by forecasting the Ry∆t(t + τ) values from those of R
x
∆t(t) via regression as
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NICCxy∆t = (totalvariance− unexplainedvariance)/totalvariance:
NICCxy∆t =
∑Tt=1 R
y
∆t(t + τ)
2 −∑Tt=1(Ry∆t(t + τ)− f (Rx∆t(t)))2
∑Tt=1 R
y
∆t(t + τ)
2
, (2)
where f (Rx∆t(t)) is the linear piecewise approximation of the nonlinear regression curve.
Remark 2. Pijn et al. (1989) commented that contrary to Pearson product moment correla-
tion coefficient, which is always symmetric, (i.e., it is the same for the relationship x, y as for
y, x, the NICC more often than not is asymmetric NICCxy∆t 6= NICCyx∆t . Interestingly enough,
when the relationship f is linear, then NICC verges on the LICC. Worthy to note is also the
fact that, the larger the asymmetry in the values of NICC from x to y and vice versa, the
more nonlinear the relationship f is. NICC values move strictly between 0 and 1. NICCxy∆t is
0 when y is independent of x and 1 when y is completely determined by x (Pijn et al. 1989).
To the best of our knowedge, NICC has never been used before in the field of finance. It
has only been employed in the field of brain signal analysis, in order to mine for nonlinear
dependencies among neurons, see Pijn et al. (1989), da Silva et al. (1989), Pijn et al. (1990)
and Wendling et al. (2001). Thus, NICC is employed for the first time in our paper for the
purpose of identifying nonlinear causal relationships among asset returns. Nonlinearities
have been important in finance literature, since many phenomena and relations in finance
are nonlinear. Frank and Stengos (1989) after conducting econometric analysis in the re-
turns of gold and silver, they found proof that their time series are governed by nonlinear
mechanisms rather than linear. Hsieh (1989) analyzed day-by-day variations in major for-
eign exchange rates through linear correlation and found no significant results. However,
after employing econometric GARCH analysis he claimed to identify that nonlinear depen-
dencies saturate the exchange rates under study. Scheinkman and LeBaron (1989) tested
dependencies in weekly returns of assets only to realize that no random walk rests in their
time series, rather nonlinear functions help explain better those dependencies and also pre-
dict future from past prices. Abhyankar et al. (1997) examined real time returns of S&P 500,
DAX, Nikkei 225, and FTSE 100. They found evidence of strong nonlinearities among those
major indices.
NICC reveals nonlinearities in the dependencies of asset returns that LICC is unable to
reveal. This fact renders NICC superior to LICC in terms of causal relationships detection.
However, NICC, taking values from 0 to 1, provides no information regarding the sign of
causality (positive or negative causality). This means that, NICC cannot tell whether two
assets have reverse or same-direction causality, contrary to LICC which may not capture
nonlinearities but does capture the sign of the causality among asset returns.
2.3 Linear Cointegration
Lead-lag relationships as examined by LICC and NICC are one form of causalities among
assets. Another form of causal relationships is that of assets that move in an integrated way,
i.e. they evolve dynamically together and this common evolution can be described by a
common function. Firstly, we shall present the case of assets cointegrated in a linear way.
Linear cointegration (LCo) is an econometric tool firstly introduced by Granger (1981), and
subsequently established by Granger and Weiss (2001), and Engle and Granger (1987). Ad-
mittedly, two series can be considered as cointegrated when a linear combination of the two
is stationary, while none of those time series is individually stationary (Hakkio and Rush
1989). Following Engle and Granger (1987), we provide the LCo method: We must examine
whether or not the two series are integrated of the same order. There are various substitute
methods to test the integration order of time series: The Dickey-Fuller (DF) (Dickey and
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Fuller, 1979) and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1981), a gen-
eralization of the ADF (Phillips and Perron, 1988) and the Kwiatkoswski-Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin (KPSS) test (Kwiatkoswski et al., 1992). Given that two series xt and yt are integrated
of the same order then in order to be cointegrated there must exist a function zt such as:
zt ∈ I(0) : zt = yt − β ∗ xt. (3)
For our analysis we shall use the ADF test (Hamilton, 1994). For further technical details, the
reader is referred to Engle and Granger (1987). In order to quantify the causal links produced
by LCo analysis in our dataset, we follow and expand the technique of Yang et al. (2014),
and assign to every causal relationship of assets the β coefficient from the cointegrating
regression and normalize it simply by dividing with the max β coefficient among all asset
pairs.
Remark 3. Thus, linear normalized cointegration link values can range from −1 to 1. When
LCoxy∆t < 0, this means that asset x is negatively cointegrated with asset y, i.e., if yesterday’s
price of asset x increases, then today’s price of asset y shall decrease, and vice versa. When,
LCoxy∆t > 0, this means that asset x positively cointegrated with asset y, i.e., if yesterday’s
price of asset x increases then today’s price of asset y shall also increase. If LCoxy∆t = 0, this
means that asset x an asset y are not cointegrated in any way.
In the finance literature, we found that the concept of cointegration (similarly to intertem-
poral cross correlation) is linked to the Efficient Market Hypothesis. According to Chowd-
hury (1991), given that market efficiency ordains that the current asset price dynamically
and immediately absorbs and reflects all available information and, given past prices, no
other information should increase the predictability of assets’ prices, then a cointegration
between two financial assets implies inefficiency. Cerchi and Havenner (1988) employed
LCo analysis in a dataset consisting of five randomly chosen industrial stocks. What they
found was that despite the individual stock time series could at best be described as ran-
dom walks, when cointegration enters into play they appear to move in a distinct common
trend. Hall et al. (1992) analyzed yields to maturity of USA Treasury bills and found strong
evidence that they move in tandem with each other dynamically through time. Liu et al.
(1997) put under scrutiny the chaotic behavior of the market indices of Shanghai and Shen-
zen. Their analysis shed light to an underlying mechanism between the two indices, as
they seemed to evolve in a cointegrating manner. Alexander (2001) after conducting robust
analysis in commodities, she claimed that related commodity types offer some windows of
opportunity, given their strong cointegration. Siliverstovs et al. (2005) investigated a dataset
consisting of natural gas markets in Europe, North America and Japan in the time period
between the early 1990s and 2004. They found a high level of natural gas market cointe-
gration within Europe, between the European and Japanese markets as well as within the
North American market. Yang et al. (2014) investigated 26 stock market indices and found
that their cointegration relationship increased after the Lehman Brothers collapse, while the
degree of cointegration gradually decreased from the sub-prime to European debt crisis.
LCo is useful enough when we are seeking causality in a sense of assets moving in a lin-
early integrated manner with an emphasis on longer temporal horizon than LICC. However,
LCo is unable to identify nonlinear cointegrating relationships. This is where its nonlinear
counterpart enters into play, as described in the next section.
2.4 Nonlinear Cointegration
Nonlinear cointegration (NCo) is the expansion of the well-established linear cointegration
(LCo) which is capable of capturing nonlinear integrated dependencies from one asset to
another. NCo was firstly introduced by Granger and Hallman (1991), and further developed
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by Balke and Fomby (1997), Escribano and Mira (2002) and Escanciano and Escribano (2011).
According to Escanciano and Escribano (2011), two extended memory series yt and xt are
nonlinearly cointegrated if there exists a function f such that:
zt = f (yt, xt) is short in memory. (4)
Crashes in extended memory time series have persisting and intense impact; while in short
memory ones, crashes are absorbed and vanish after a short time (Escanciano and Escribano,
2011). Memory in time series, and its characterization as short or extended, can be measured
via various means. In our analysis, we use the conditional mean persistence method from
the aforementioned paper. A time series xt is considered to be of short memory in mean if for
all t, M(t, h) = E(yt+h|It), h > 0, tends to a constant µ as h becomes large (for more details
see Escanciano and Escribano, 2011). Given that we found no method of quantifying the
nonlinear cointegration among two variables in the literature, we devise our own method
which is described below.
We propose to assign as the weight of a nonlinear cointegration from asset x to asset
y, the weighted average of the coefficients in function f from Eq. (4). We allow in our
algorithm to search for candidate functions f up to 10th degree polynomials, thus the higher
the terms power the greater the weight assigned to it. For each cointegrating relationship
after summing those ten coefficients, we divide with the max of the coefficient averages
among all asset pairs, in order to claim a normalized quantity for NCo. Thus, nonlinear
cointegration link values (as normalized by us) can range from −1 to 1. When NCoxy < 0,
this means that asset x is negatively cointegrated with asset y. When NCoxy > 0, this means
that asset x positively cointegrated with asset y. If NCoxyt = 0, this means that asset x and
asset y are not cointegrated in any way.
Li (2002) analyzed the stock market indices of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, UK and
USA in terms of both LCo and NCo. His results indicated that nonlinear cointegration rela-
tionships among those indices are much stronger and persisting as compared to the linear
ones. Ma and Kanas (2004) found strong further empirical evidence to support the intrinsic
bubble model of stock prices, developed by Froot and Obstfeld (1991). Athanasenas et al.
(2014) conducted analysis between the time series of revenues and expenditures of the Greek
government. Their results support the fact that negative rates of expenditures severely im-
pact revenues. Apergis and Payne (2014) analyzed asset returns from the stock markets of
the G7. They found long-lasting nonlinear dependencies in a significant portion of their
dataset.
2.5 Linear Granger Causality
Granger causality is a statistical concept of causality that is based on regression. It has been
widely used in the financial econometrics literature to detect causal relationships among
assets and other economic variables. According to Granger causality, if a time series xt
”Granger-causes” (or ”G-causes”) a time series yt, then past values of xt should contain
predictive information that serves to forecast yt better than the information contained in
past values of yt alone. The so-called predictive information is modelled through regression,
(linear for LGC and nonlinear for NGC in section 2.6) Granger, (1969). Following Granger
(1969), given xt and yt are stationary, if we consider a linear autoregressive (AR) model of
time series yt:
yt =
N
∑
i=1
a11,iyt−i +
N
∑
i=1
a12,ixt−i + Et(y), (5)
where N is the number of past observations included in the AR-model, a11,i and a12,i are the
coefficients of the model, Et(y) is the residual, also known as prediction errors, for yt. We
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can say that x G− causes y if and only if the coefficients a12,i are significantly different from
zero. To test the underlying significance, we employ the F-test with the null hypothesis that
a12,i = 0. In the literature we found no method of quantifying the weight of a G-causal link
from an asset x to an asset y.
So given that asset x Granger causes y we decide to assign as weight of the link the
value: LGCxy = 1− Pvalue of the F-test. Values range from 0 to 1 denoting the intensity of
the causality.
Bradshaw and Orden (1990) uncovered important LGC from the exchange rate to export
sales, while the evidence on causality from the exchange rate to prices is unclear. Rahman
et al. (1997) analyzed USA equities and bonds. Their results attested that the causality
emanating from bonds to equities is much more robust than vice versa. Abhyankar (1998)
investigated causal relationships between the futures contracts and cash markets. Accord-
ing to his results, futures contracts hold predictive information for the future states of cash
market. Dutta (2001) found that causality from levels of telecommunications infrastructure
to economic activity is stronger than that for causality in the opposite direction. Foresti
(2006) put under scrutiny the possibility of causal relationships between economic growth
and stock market returns, concluding that stock market drives the economic growth. Wang
et al. (2007) tested for possible linkages among Euro currency, USA, Japanese and German
interest rates. Their results indicated that Japanese interest rates exert intense causality over-
all, and that the German interest rates have a bidirectional causal relationship with a variety
of Euro currency rates. Zhang and Wei, 2010, uncovered that crude oil prices have a statisti-
cally significant causal relationship to the prices of gold, but the opposite was not supported.
Billio et al. (2012) analyzed time series data of hedge funds, banks, broker/dealers, and in-
surance companies. Their findings support the fact that banks exert the most causality to all
the other time series they analyzed. Vy´rost et al. (2015) uncovered an underlying mecha-
nism of a preferential attachment between stock markets, i.e., the probability of the presence
of spillover effects between any given two markets increases with their degree of connect-
edness to others. Fiedor (2015) analyzed the relationships of companies listed in S&P 100
and found that causal relationships are more prevalent than lagged synchronization rela-
tionships.
One drawback of LGC is that it does not provide any information regarding whether the
assets under study have positive or negative causality. Another drawback is its inability to
capture nonlinearities. The latter drawback is treated with its nonlinear counterpart which
is presented below.
2.6 Nonlinear Granger Causality
Nonlinear Granger Causality (NGC) is capable of mining the nonlinear predictive infor-
mation that a time series can hold for another time series, a feat that LGC fails to accom-
plish. NGC was firstly introduced by Hiemstra and Jones (1994) and further established by
Pe´guin-Feissolle et al. (2013). Following the definition of Pe´guin-Feissolle et al. (2013), let
yt and xt be two stationary and ergodic time series. In order to test the existence of a causal
relationship between two series, we denote:
yt = fy(yt−1, , yt−p1 , xt−1, , xt−q1 ; 1) + e1,t. (6)
Eq. (6) includes all combinations between past values of y and x. We can say that x nonlin-
early G-causes y if and only if the coefficients on the terms of x’s past values are significantly
different from zero. To test the underlying significance, we can use the Wald F-test (for more
technical details regarding the methodology of NGC see Pguin-Feissolle et al., 2013). In the
literature we found no method of quantifying the weight of a nonlinear G-causal link from
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an asset x to an asset y. So given that asset x nonlinearly Granger causes y we decided to
assign as weight of the link the value: NGCxy = 1− P value of the Wald F-test. Values range
from 0 to 1 denoting the intensity of the causality.
Hiemstra and Jones (1994) having used NGC between the equity returns of Dow Jones
stocks, and the volume rate of NYSE, found statistically important causality in both ways.
Qiao et al. (2011) sought for causalities in East Asia stock markets. Despite the fact that
LGC tests failed to detect statistically significant dependencies, its nonlinear kindred-NGC
captured many causalities. Benhmad (2012) similarly, analyzed oil prices and USA Dollar
exchange rate. He found supporting evidence of oil influencing the dollar rate slightly more
than vice versa. Zhou et al. (2014) examined a dataset Chinese stock futures and spot mar-
kets. The authors claim to have found robust results in favor of futures influencing spot
markets. Chu et al. (2015) conducted a research between equity returns and investor sen-
timent in China. Surprisingly enough, they found that both types of time series influence
each other in a nonlinear way.
In the last two sections of causality tools we shall deviate from the disciplines of statistics
and econometrics and summon methodologies from information theory.
2.7 Shadow Causality
The previously described causality methods suffer from several important weaknesses. Ei-
ther they depend to requirements of stationarity (LICC, NICC, LCo, NCo, LGC, NGC) or
they are unable to capture nonlinearities (LICC, LCo, LGC) or they cannot distinguish be-
tween positive (homogeneous) and negative (heterogeneous) causality (NICC, LGC, NGC).
This is where tools from information theory come into play, namely: shadow causality (SC)
which is based on mutual information and hidden causality (HC) which is based on trans-
fer entropy. These information theoretic methods are nonparametric, have no requirements
of stationary time series to be applied to, capture both linear and nonlinear causality, and
with a minor modification we were able to make them distinguish between positive and
negative causality. Following Granger and Lin (1994), shadow correlation and inspired by
Schreiber (2000), who suggested that one can use a lead-lag in mutual information to imbue
directionality in our calculations, we provide the shadow causality formula:
SCxt−∆t,yt = sgn ∗
√
1− e−2I(xt−∆t,yt ), (7)
where I(xt−∆t, yt) =
∫ ∫
px,y(xt−∆t, yt) ∗ log px,y(xt−∆t,yt)px(xt−∆t)∗py(yt)dx dy is the mutual information
(MI). p(x, y) denotes the joint probability distribution function of time series xt and yt. p(x)
and p(y) denote the marginal probability distribution functions of xt and yt, respectively.
The function SCxt−∆t,yt captures the overall linear and nonlinear causality from x to y. If
causality is homogeneous, then sgn = +1 (homogeneous causality takes place when an in-
crease in x causes increase in y more often than decrease in y while at the same time decrease
in x causes decrease in y more often than increase in y). If causality is heterogeneous, then
sgn = −1 (heterogeneous causality takes place when increase in x causes decrease in y more
often than increase in y while at the same time decrease in x causes increase in y more often
than decrease in y). SC values range from −1 to 1 denoting the intensity and type (neg-
ative values denote heterogeneous relationship and positive values denote homogeneous
relationship) of the causality.
Dionisio et al. (2007) created a bundle of economic and financial indicators from Por-
tugal and tested for possible dependencies among them via MI analysis. Their analysis
showed that there are strong causalities from dividend yield and earnings price ratio time
2 CAUSALITY METHODOLOGIES 11
series to the monthly excess returns of investors. Maasoumi and Wang (2008) tested for de-
pendencies in economic growth time series among various municipalities in China. They
found significant formations of clubs among municipalities, manifesting before and after
reformation periods. Menezes et al. (2012) analyzed equity time series, representative of the
G7 countries. Comparing their results with other methods like that of LGC they claim that
MI provided more information regarding the underlying causalities in the stocks of their
dataset. Fiedor (2014) investigated nonlinear relationships of companies listed in the NYSE.
He found that mutual information rate produces different results than simple correlation.
In the next section, we present the last causality tool to conclude our methodology section.
2.8 Hidden Causality
Mutual information which is the basis of shadow causality, needs the time lag to account
for directionality and thus causality. Therefore, one can argue that it is not a natural tool
of causality inference (much like LICC and NICC) rather a manufactured one. Transfer
entropy (TE) on the other hand, which is the basis of HC, is a natural tool of causality
inference. TE is one of the youngest members of the causality family as it was recently
introduced by Schreiber (2000). It exploits past values of time series xt and yt to test their
predictive power for the future value of yt+1. In a similar fashion to the notion of SC, we
introduce at this point the HC method which instead of MI uses the stricter TE (Screiber,
2000). Thus, HC is the normalized version of TE, and for its normalization technique we
used the method by Junior (2013). Our contribution lies only in the part of mining the sign
of positive or negative in a similar manner as we did in SC. The HC formula:
HCxt→ yt = sgn ∗
∑ p(yt+1, yt, xt) log
p(yt+1ytxt)
(p(yt+1yt)
∑ p(yt, xt) log2
p(yt,xt)
p(xt)
, (8)
where ∑ p(yt+1, yt, xt) log
p(yt+1ytxt)
p(yt+1yt)
= TExt→ yt , which is the TE of x to y and ∑ p(yt+1, yt)
log2
p(yt+1,yt)
p(yt)
= HyF|yP , which is the conditional entropy of the future of y on its past. For
more technical details; see the papers of Schreiber (2000) and Junior (2013). If causality
is homogeneous, then sgn = +1 (homogeneous causality takes place when an increase in x
causes increase in y more often than decrease in y while at the same time decrease in x causes
decrease in y more often than increase in y). If causality is heterogeneous, then sgn = −1
(heterogeneous causality takes place when increase in x causes decrease in y more often than
increase in y while at the same time decrease in x causes increase in y more often than de-
crease in y). HC values range from −1 to 1 denoting the intensity and type (negative values
denote heterogeneous relationship and positive values denote homogeneous relationship)
of the causality.
Baek et al. (2005) analyzed via TE a dataset consisting of equities from various industrial
sectors, and they found that energy related equities such as oil, gas and electricity saturate
the whole market. Kwon and Yang (2008) mined for causal relationships in international
stock market indices, uncovered that S&P 500 emanates the most causality to all the other
indices. Kim et al. (2013) examined stock market indices from the majority of the G20.
Their results stand in favor of the theory that western countries exert stronger causality in
eastern countries than vice versa. Sandoval (2014) put under scrutiny the companies that are
included in S&P 100. Their results indicate that TE produces a network that creates much
more realistic (in terms of industrial affinity) clusters than LICC. Junior (2015) analysed
the pairs of 83 stock market indices of various countries and found that TE is an effective
way to quantify the information flow between indices. Yook et al. (2016) studied a financial
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network, and they found that the modular structure from LICC cannot correctly reflect the
known industrial classification and their hierarchy opposite to the transfer entropy method
which fits much better on the market segmentation.
Table 1 briefly summarizes all the causality methods described in Section 2 and some of
their basic properties.
Table 1: Causality Methods Trivia
Causality Method Type ofcausality identification Values range
Need time series
to be stationary
Linear Intertemporal
Cross Correlation Linear [−1, 1] Yes
Nonlinear Intertemporal
Cross Correlation Linear and Nonlinear [0, 1] Yes
Linear Cointegration Linear [−1, 1] Yes
Nonlinear Cointegration Nonlinear [−1, 1] Yes
Linear Granger Causality Linear [0, 1] Yes
Nonlinear Granger Causality Nonlinear [0, 1] Yes
Shadow Causality Linear and Nonlinear [−1, 1] No
Hidden Causality Linear and Nonlinear [−1, 1] No
3 Data and Filtering
For our analysis, we use weekly data for stock market indices, sovereign bonds and oil from
the Thomson Reuters DataStream for the period of 4th January 2000 to 12th February 2016.
By using weekly data we negate the Time Zone effects due to the different operating hours
of the stock exchanges in different countries. The idea is to have a broad and global selec-
tion of financial assets, and to understand their interactions over time by means of causal-
ity analysis. Thus, our dataset consists of 10 stock market indices, namely: SHANGHAI,
BOVESPA(BSE), DOW JONES, S&P 500, DAX 30, HANGSENG, CAC 40, NIKKEI 225,
ASX 200 and BOMBAY STOCK EXCHANGE; 14 bonds, namely: 2Y USA bond, 10Y USA
bond, 10Y UK bond, 2Y German bond, 10Y German bond, 2Y Japanese bond, 10Y Japanese bond,
2Y Australian bond, 10Y Australian bond, 10Y Swiss bond, 2to3Y Spanish bond, 10Y Greek bond,
3Y Italian bond and 10Y Italian bond; and Oil (see also Table 2). We use a rolling window
of two years to construct the evolutionary financial network, which evolves week by week
from 4th January 2000 until 12th February 2016 (total of 738 weeks of network evolution)
for each of the eight causality tools presented in Section 2. The time lag used for our anal-
ysis is one week, and the statistical significance to keep a causal link is 95%. In order to
negate nonstationarity we take the logreturns of the time series and again test with ADF for
nonstationarity. No time series in our dataset are found to be nonstationary after logreturns
apply. After constructing 25× 25 matrices for each of the 738 weeks and each of the eight
causality methods, we apply the filtering method of maximum spanning tree in each ma-
trix (Hu, 1961). That way, we are able to apply the strongest known filtering and keep only
the most powerful causal relations. Nevertheless, it is quite common to see other filtering
methods being applied in financial networks, such as the minimum spanning tree (mse),
which has been thoroughly employed in the works of Rosario Mantegna, who was the first
to introduce it in finance (Mantegna, 1999a and 1999b). Minimum spanning tree was also
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effectively used by Di Matteo et al., (2010), Aste and Di Matteo (2006) who also added their
own flavor to filtering. Other filtering methods are that of random matrix theory used by
Iori et al. (2007) and Bonferroni statistical filtering which was well-displayed by Iori, Man-
tegna and collaborators in Iori et al. (2015). Last, but definitely not least, we would like to
mention the filtering method of planar maximally filtered graph, which has been applied in
the works of Di Matteo et al., (2010), Kenett et al. (2010), Birch et al. (2015) and Musmeci et
al (2015, 2016 a, 2016 b).
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Table 2: Dataset details and asset numbering for Figures 9 to 16.
No Asset Details
1 SHANGHAI A stock market index of all stocks (A shares and B shares)that are traded at the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
2 BOVESPA An index of about 50 stocks that are traded on the Sao PauloStock, Mercantile and Futures Exchange.
3 DOW JONES
A stock market index, and one of several indices created
by Wall Street Journal editor and Dow Jones & Company
co-founder Charles Dow.
4 S&P 500
An American stock market index based on the market
capitalizations of 500 large companies having common
stock listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ.
5 DAX 30 A blue chip stock market index consisting of the 30 majorGerman companies trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
6 HANGSENG
A freefloat-adjusted market capitalization-weighted stock
market index in Hong Kong. It is used to record and
monitor daily changes of the largest companies of the
Hong Kong stock market.
7 CAC 40
It represents a capitalization-weighted measure of the 40
most significant values among the 100 highest market
caps on the Euronext Paris
8 NIKKEI 225
It is a price-weighted index of the Tokyo Stock Exchange,
and the components are reviewed once a year.
Currently, the Nikkei is the most widely quoted average of
Japanese equities.
9 ASX 200
A market-capitalization weighted and float-adjusted stock
market index of Australian stocks listed on the
Australian Securities Exchange from Standard & Poor’s.
10 BSE
A free-float market-weighted stock market index of 30
well-established and financially sound companies listed
on Bombay Stock Exchange.
11 2Y USA bond A two years-to-maturity sovereign US bond.
12 10Y USA bond A ten years-to-maturity sovereign US bond.
13 10Y UK bond A ten years-to-maturity sovereign UK bond.
14 2Y German bond A two years-to-maturity sovereign German bond.
15 10Y German bond A ten years-to-maturity sovereign German bond.
16 2Y Japanese bond A two years-to-maturity sovereign Japanese bond.
17 10Y Japanese bond A ten years-to-maturity sovereign Japanese bond.
18 2Y Australian bond A two years-to-maturity sovereign Australian bond.
19 10Y Australian bond A ten years-to-maturity sovereign Australian bond.
20 10Y Swiss bond A ten years-to-maturity sovereign Swiss bond.
21 2to3Y Spanish bond A two to three years-to-maturity sovereign Spanish bond.
22 10Y Greek bond A ten years-to-maturity sovereign Greek bond.
23 3Y Italian bond A three years-to-maturity sovereign Italian bond.
24 10Y Italian bond A ten years-to-maturity sovereign Italian bond.
25 Oil Crude Oil as traded in NYMEX.
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4 Causality Network Analytics
4.1 Sundial of causality: the casting of a shadow
that aligns with varying “financial times”
As we are motivated to examine the predictive capacity of causalities for financial turbu-
lence, we examine how the financial network changes over time. Was the global financial
crisis somehow imprinted on the average causality of the market before, during or after the
event? In order to seek for answers we examined the evolution of the average causality rest-
ing in the network, week by week, in a rolling window of one year. Below we present the
results of this analysis for each of the eight methods.
During the bubble burst of early 2000s, LICC in Fig. 1 is on average 33% and displays
a slightly upward trend as it peaks during the last breath of the rundown (October 2002).
During the pre-crisis period it moves at an average of 27.42%; more specifically, it enters a
defined slide down throughout 2003, and then from 2004 up until the July of 2007 it fluctu-
ates with a slight upward trend (Table 3).
Figure 1: Average of Linear Intertemporal Cross Correlation (LICC) for all assets week by
week, rolling window of 2 years. Red Timespans: Periods of financial turmoil. 2001-2002:
Post-Dotcom bubble burst, 2007-2009: Global Finacial Crisis, 2015: Chinese Stock Market
Crash
The global financial crisis period is characterized by a dramatic drop of LICC with an aver-
age value of 24.29%, but then at the summer of 2009, we observe a confident rising move as
the echoes of crisis die out. The post crisis period is characterized by a generic and fluctu-
ating drop of LICC, which is on average 18.95% (Table 4). LICC enters the recent financial
crash of China in an upward trend, however its levels are already as low as 15.08% (Table
5).
As we observe the evolutionary behavior of NICC, see Fig. 2, during the stock market
rundown of early 2000s, it is on average 29.18% and displays a flat trend throughout that
period. During the pre-crisis period it moves at an average of 28.33%; more specifically
NICC moves slightly downwards from 2004 to 2006 until it suddenly drops even more half
a year before the birth of the global financial crisis (Table 3).
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Figure 2: Average of Nonlinear Intertemporal Cross Correlation (NICC) for all assets week
by week, rolling window of 2 years. Red Timespans: Periods of financial turmoil. 2001-
2002: Post-Dotcom bubble burst, 2007-2009: Global Finacial Crisis, 2015: Chinese Stock
Market Crash
The global financial crisis period is characterized by a dramatic increase of NICC with an
average value of 40.91%, but then at the summer of 2009 we observe a plunge until the crisis
died out. The post crisis period is characterized by a defined increase of NICC, which is
on average 49.09% (Table 4). NICC enters the stock market plunge of China in an upward
trend, however its levels are already as low as 19.38% (Table 5).
Regarding LCo, as seen in Fig. 3, during the during the Dotcom bubble burst it is on
average 20.34% and displays an upward trend throughout the rundown (October 2002).
During the pre-crisis period LCo displays extreme fluctuations around an average of 26.66%
and just before the crisis its trend transforms to a rising one (Table 3).
Figure 3: Average of Linear Cointegration (LCo) for all assets week by week, rolling window
of 2 years. Red Timespans: Periods of financial turmoil. 2001-2002: Post-Dotcom bubble
burst, 2007-2009: Global Finacial Crisis, 2015: Chinese Stock Market Crash
The global financial crisis period is characterized by a smooth drop of LCo with an average
value of 30.06% but then at the summer of 2009 it stops falling and moves on a defined
support level around 25%. The post crisis period is characterized by a continued move
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on the same resistance level as before until the end of 2011. Then LCo spikes around the
summer of 2012 at 40% and begins a defined downward trend at an average of 24.04% (Table
4). LCo meets the financial crisis caused by China in a change of trend from negative levels
to positive ones, however its levels are already as low as −0.53% (Table 5).
As far as NCo is concerned, Fig. 4, during the stock market crash of early 2000s it is on
the negative side averaging −6.03% and displays a slightly upward trend as it peaks during
the last breath of the rundown (October 2002) nearing the zero level. During the pre-crisis
period NCo moves at an average of 0.44%; more specifically it displays an abrupt spike at
the first half of 2003 hitting a ceiling 20%, and then from 2004 up until the July of 2007 it
fluctuates with a marked downward trend, joining again the negative side as early as 2006.
It bottoms just before the breakout of the crisis at the lowest level ever around −15% (Table
3).
Figure 4: Average of Nonlinear Cointegration (NCo) for all assets week by week, rolling
window of 2 years. Red Timespans: Periods of financial turmoil. 2001-2002: Post-Dotcom
bubble burst, 2007-2009: Global Finacial Crisis, 2015: Chinese Stock Market Crash
The global financial crisis period is characterized by a wild fluctuation of NCo around an
average of 7.71%. The post crisis period is characterized by a milder fluctuation of NCo,
which is on average 6.79% (Table 4). NCo enters the Chinese market crash after a prolonged
trail with an attractor around zero, being sometimes positive and sometimes negative but
always averaging 0.18% (Table 5).
Next we focus in LGC, in Fig. 5, and we can notice that during the rundown of early
2000s it moves around a support level of 77.52%. During the pre-crisis period it fluctuates a
little higher than before at an average of 83.81%. After 2004 however, LGC is characterized
by a smooth upward trend until the last quarter of 2006 when it started rolling somewhat
downwards (Table 3).
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Figure 5: Average of Linear Granger Causality (LGC) for all assets week by week, rolling
window of 2 years. Red Timespans: Periods of financial turmoil. 2001-2002: Post-Dotcom
bubble burst, 2007-2009: Global Finacial Crisis, 2015: Chinese Stock Market Crash
The global financial crisis period is characterized in the outbreak by a faintly diminishing
LGC with an average value of 74.8% but then at the end of 2008 we observe a defined drop
below 70% finding a new support level at the twilight of the global crisis. The post crisis
period is characterized by a generic and fluctuating increase of LGC until the summer of
2012, which is on average 64.62%. However, after the third quarter of 2012 the trend changes
to a diminishing one hitting as low as 38% (Table 4). LGC enters the Chinese rundown in
an upward trend, however its levels are already as low as 53.62% (Table 5).
Concerning NGC, see Fig. 6, emerging from the Dotcom burst it is found on a faintly
upward trend averaging 68.81% with the trend becoming steeper as the rundown died out
on October 2002. During the pre-crisis period NGC plateaued at an average of 77.96% until
the end of 2014 when it suddenly dropped at the support level of 60%. Then, in the summer
of 2005 it bounced back up, continuing its rising trend until the summer of 2006 when it
reached a resistance level of 88% and began falling again, just one year before the breakout
of the crisis (Table 3).
Figure 6: Average of Nonlinear Granger Causality (NGC) for all assets week by week, rolling
window of 2 years. Red Timespans: Periods of financial turmoil. 2001-2002: Post-Dotcom
bubble burst, 2007-2009: Global Finacial Crisis, 2015: Chinese Stock Market Crash
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On the eve of the global financial crisis NGC fall again to same support level as before (60%)
while at the end of 2008 it bounced up to between 70% and 80% moving at an average value
of 73.14% until the end of the crisis. The post crisis period is characterized by a historically
unique drop of NGC reaching a deep support level at just 20% and staying there from the
summer of 2012 until the summer of 2013 when it started rising again in a volatile manner
(Table 4). The late Chinese shock found NGC still on the rising at an average of 59.41%
(Table 5).
Furthermore, the post-Dotcom bubble burst is characterized by an SC, Fig. 7, on average
18.77% while its trend is downward. During the pre-crisis period SC enters a marked rising
trend averaging 32.16% even after the birth of the global crisis. Throughout the pre-crisis
period SC more than doubled from 20% in 2003 to 50% in the summer of 2007 (Table 3).
Figure 7: Average of Shadow Causality (SC) for all assets week by week, rolling window
of 2 years. Red Timespans: Periods of financial turmoil. 2001-2002: Post-Dotcom bubble
burst, 2007-2009: Global Finacial Crisis, 2015: Chinese Stock Market Crash
The global financial crisis period is characterized by an extreme plunge of SC from the resis-
tance level of 50% to a support level of 17% with an average value of 29.97%. In the twilight
of the crisis (2009) SC rested at the plateau of 20% entering in that trend the post-crisis pe-
riod. The post crisis period is characterized by a defined increase of SC to a new support
level of 30% from 2011 to 2012 and then in 2013 this support level becomes resistance level
forcing the SC to rest beneath 30% with an average of 28.65% (Table 4). SC enters the fi-
nancial crash of China in a faintly downward trend sliding the plateau of 28.31% (Table
5).
Ultimately, HC in Fig. 8, during the stock market rundown of early 2000s is on average
5.48% and displays a slightly upward trend as it peaks on the exhaustion of the rundown
(October 2002). During the pre-crisis period it moves at an average of 14.19%; more specif-
ically HC is governed by a steep increase from 2003 all through the summer of 2004 when
it hit the resistance level of 25%, and then it enters a prolonged and flat fluctuation down-
wards to the support level of 10% in the summer of 2006 almost one year before the global
crisis (Table 3).
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Figure 8: Average of Hidden Causality (HC) for all assets week by week, rolling window
of 2 years. Red Timespans: Periods of financial turmoil. 2001-2002: Post-Dotcom bubble
burst, 2007-2009: Global Finacial Crisis, 2015: Chinese Stock Market Crash
The global financial crisis found HC on the rising with an average value of 11.90% but then
in the summer of 2008 we witness a marked diminishing trend as the global crisis enters its
mature phase. The post crisis period is characterized by an extension of the former down-
ward trend until the eve of 2012 moving at an average of 5.34%. Then HC after having fallen
to the negative side at around −5%, we can see that it rallies up 15% at the end of 2012 and
fluctuating above the support level of 5% until 2014 when it marks a steep decline to again
sub-zero levels (Table 4). HC enters the financial crisis caused by China in a slightly upward
trend, however its levels are already as low as 5.35% (Table 5).
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Table 3: Causalities general statistics from the Dotcom Bubble burst until before the Global Financial Crisis
Stock Market Rundown of
Post-Dotcom bubble burst:
March 2000 to October 2002
Pre-crisis period:
November 2002 to July 2007
Causality
Methods Min Avg Max StDev Trend Min Avg Max StDev Trend
LICC 0.2666 0.3300 0.3620 0.0232 ↑ 0.1618 0.2742 0.3584 0.0372 ↓→↑
NICC 0.2320 0.2918 0.3469 0.0188 → 0.1008 0.2833 0.4655 0.0612 →↓
LCo 0.1294 0.2034 0.2692 0.0339 ↑ 0.0478 0.2666 0.5589 0.1164 ↓↑↓→↑
NCo -0.1650 -0.0603 0.0348 0.0564 ↑ -0.2186 0.0044 0.2452 0.1008 ↓
LGC 0.7076 0.7752 0.8631 0.0333 → 0.6472 0.8381 0.9485 0.0684 →↑→
NGC 0.6026 0.6881 0.8138 0.0562 ↑ 0.5313 0.7796 0.9246 0.0785 →↓↑→
SC 0.1278 0.1877 0.2297 0.0281 ↓ 0.1203 0.3216 0.5103 0.0965 ↑
HC 0.0042 0.0548 0.0903 0.0179 ↑ 0.0225 0.1419 0.3409 0.0616 ↑↓↑↓
LICC: Linear Intertemporal Cross Correlation, NICC: Nonlinear Intertemporal Cross Correlation, LCo: Linear Cointegration, NCo:
Nonlinear Cointegration, LGC: Linear Granger Casuality, NGC: Nonlinear Granger Causality, SC: Shadow Causality, HC: Hidden Causal-
ity.
Min, Avg, Max and StDev are calculated in terms of the already average causality among all financial assets throughout the time period
declared.
Trend symbols: ↑ denotes an upward trend, ↓ denotes a downward trend, → denotes a flat trend. When two or more trend symbols
are written in a row they symbolize consecutive trend changes.
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Table 4: Causalities general statistics during and after the Global Financial Crisis
Global Financial Crisis:
August 2007 to December 2009
Post-crisis period:
January 2010 to May 2015
Causality
Methods Min Avg Max StDev Trend Min Avg Max StDev Trend
LICC 0.0425 0.2429 0.3632 0.0844 ↓↑ 0.0377 0.1895 0.3540 0.0903 ↑↓↑
NICC 0.0748 0.4091 0.5563 0.1053 ↑↓ 0.2379 0.3610 0.4909 0.0609 ↑↓
LCo 0.2336 0.3006 0.4065 0.0498 ↓→ -0.0134 0.2404 0.4281 0.1080 →↑↓
NCo -0.2359 0.0771 0.3241 0.0900 ↑↓↑↓↑↓ -0.1667 0.0679 0.2979 0.0890
↑→↓↑
↓→↑→
LGC 0.4861 0.7480 0.9192 0.0989 →↓→ 0.4148 0.6462 0.8098 0.0952 →↓
NGC 0.4887 0.7314 0.9344 0.0752 ↓↑→ 0.0441 0.5327 0.8754 0.2073 ↓↑
SC 0.1545 0.2997 0.5327 0.1269 ↓ 0.1717 0.2865 0.4037 0.0559 ↑→↓→
HC 0.0310 0.1190 0.1996 0.0353 ↓ -0.0887 0.0534 0.1625 0.0649 ↓↑↓↑
LICC: Linear Intertemporal Cross Correlation, NICC: Nonlinear Intertemporal Cross Correlation, LCo: Linear Cointegration, NCo:
Nonlinear Cointegration, LGC: Linear Granger Casuality, NGC: Nonlinear Granger Causality, SC: Shadow Causality, HC: Hidden Causal-
ity.
Min, Avg, Max and StDev are calculated in terms of the already average causality among all financial assets throughout the time period
declared.
Trend symbols: ↑ denotes an upward trend, ↓ denotes a downward trend, → denotes a flat trend. When two or more trend symbols
are written in a row they symbolize consecutive trend changes.
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Table 5: Causalities general statistics during the Chinese Stock Market Crash
Chinese Stock Market Turbulence:
June 2015 to February 2016
Causality
Methods Min Avg Max StDev Trend
LICC 0.0187 0.1508 0.2298 0.0495 ↑
NICC 0.0499 0.1938 0.2839 0.0564 ↑
LCo -0.2074 -0.0053 0.0782 0.0525 →
NCo -0.1452 0.0018 0.0881 0.0357 →
LGC 0.1763 0.5362 0.7201 0.1349 ↑
NGC 0.3172 0.5941 0.7849 0.0998 ↑
SC 0.2208 0.2831 0.3296 0.0220 →
HC 0.0535 0.0685 0.1730 0.0642 ↓→↑
LICC: Linear Intertemporal Cross Correlation, NICC: Nonlinear Intertemporal Cross Correlation, LCo: Linear Cointegration, NCo:
Nonlinear Cointegration, LGC: Linear Granger Casuality, NGC: Nonlinear Granger Causality, SC: Shadow Causality, HC: Hidden Causal-
ity.
Min, Avg, Max and StDev are calculated in terms of the already average causality among all financial assets throughout the time period
declared.
Trend symbols: ↑ denotes an upward trend, ↓ denotes a downward trend, → denotes a flat trend. When two or more trend symbols
are written in a row they symbolize consecutive trend changes.
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4.2 The causalities family: convergence or divergence?
Despite the fact that all of the causality methods presented in this article are normalized
with values range either [−1, 1] or [0, 1], we cannot conduct a comparative analysis among
them because they measure causality through different approaches (for a detailed under-
standing of what each method measures as causality see Section 2). Instead what we can
do is simply attest to each methods reaction and probable predictive capacity to events of
the financial market, separately. To further justify the argument of incomparability among
the eight causality methods we undertake a similarity analysis (percentage of similar links
calculation) for each of the 738 weeks of our evolutionary network and then calculate the
average similarity across all weeks for all the possible combinations of the causality meth-
ods. The results of this comparison are presented succinctly in Table 6. The highest average
similarity among any two causality tools is 48.74% of links and occurred between LICC and
LGC. The lowest average similarity among any two causality tools is 1.07% of links and oc-
curred between LICC and LCo. Thus we consider comparative analysis out of the question,
at least in our experimental context. Maybe with the use of another filtering method, or even
no filtering at all, we could possibly find some common ground to lay some comparisons.
Table 6: Averaged Similarity throughout all the time period
Causality
Methods LICC NICC LCo NCo LGC NGC SC HC
LICC 100% 3.12% 1.07% 5.54% 48.74% 29.69% 3.41% 15.77%
NICC 3.12% 100% 1.67% 8.33% 7.67% 6.65% 3.84% 3.28%
LCo 1.07% 1.67% 100% 1.98% 1.94% 2.27% 4.27% 4.78%
NCo 5.54% 8.33% 1.98% 100% 4.54% 4.04% 4.47% 2.71%
LGC 48.74% 7.67% 1.94% 4.54% 100% 39.44% 2.24% 15.67%
NGC 29.69% 6.65% 2.27% 4.04% 39.44% 100% 2.56% 13.01%
SC 3.41% 3.84% 4.27% 4.47% 2.24% 2.56% 100% 4.36%
HC 15.77% 3.28% 2.71% 2.71% 15.67% 13.01% 4.36% 100%
LICC: Linear Intertemporal Cross Correlation, NICC: Nonlinear Intertemporal Cross
Correlation, LCo: Linear Cointegration, NCo: Nonlinear Cointegration, LGC: Linear Granger
Casuality, NGC: Nonlinear Granger Causality, SC: Shadow Causality, HC: Hidden Causal-
ity.
The percentage quantifies the ratio of similar links after the maximum spanning tree
filtering is applied. Maximum spanning tree keeps only the strongest links of the network
(in absolute values) but still keeps the network connected.
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4.3 Causal linkages: time-tested relationships
Having studied the evolution of the eight causality metrics, and after proving their lack of
similarity we move on to some distinct features like the most important links and assets. In
Tables 7 through 11 we present the top ten of the links in terms of each causality separately
and the overall top 30 links in terms of all causalities together. As we can see from Table
7, in terms of LICC the most important causal relationship is that of 10Y−USA−bond →
10Y−German−bond with a LICC = 44.03%. However, in terms of NICC the most causal
pair is that of DAX 30 → CAC40 with a NICC = 72.49%. Furthermore, if we take
a look at Table 8, we notice that in terms of LCo the most important causal relationship
is 10Y−German−bond → BOVESPA with LC = 79.40%, while in terms of NC the most
causal pair is that of 10Y−UK−bond −−→ 2Y−USA−bond with NCo = −28.99%. In terms of
LGC the most important relationship is that of 3Y−Italian−bond → 2to3Y−Spanish−bond,
with LGC = 56.91%. However, in terms of NGC, the most important causal pair is that
of 10Y−Greek−bond → 2to3Y−Spanish−bond with NGC = 45.25% (Table 9). In terms
of SC the most important causal relationship is that of DAX30 → BSE with a score of
24.25%. Nevertheless, the most important causal relationship in terms of HC is that of
10Y−USA−bond → 10Y−German−bond with a score of 48.64% (Table 10). Finally, if we
consider the average ranking of all causalities the most important causal pair overall is that
of 10Y−USA−bond → 2to3Y−Spanish−bond (Table 11).
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Table 7: Top 10 out of 600 Links in terms of strength throughout the time period examined for Linear
Intertemporal Cross Correlation and Nonlinear Intertemporal Cross Correlation
Rank Linear IntertemporalCross Correlation Score
Nonlinear Intertemporal
Cross Correlation Score
1 10Y-USA-bond→10Y-German-bond 0.4403 DAX30→ CAC40 0.7249
2 10Y-USA-bond→10Y-Australian-bond 0.4105 S&P500→ DOW JONES 0.6951
3 10Y-USA-bond→10Y-Japanese-bond 0.4092 NIKKEI225→ CAC40 0.5338
4 10Y-USA-bond→2to3Y-Spanish-bond 0.3956 S&P500→ CAC40 0.4241
5 DOW JONES→NIKKEI225 0.3834 CAC40→ S&P500 0.4065
6 BOVESPA→BSE 0.3766
10Y-Italian-bond→
3Y- Italian bond 0.4010
7 10Y-USA-bond→10Y-Swiss-bond 0.3509 HANGSENG→ CAC40 0.3983
8 BOVESPA→HANGSENG 0.3265
10Y-German-bond→
10Y-UK-bond 0.3807
9 S&P500→NIKKEI225 0.3075 HANGSENG→ BOVESPA 0.3726
10 DOW JONES→BSE 0.3021 HANGSENG→ S&P500 0.3699
Causality symbols: x→y denotes that x influences y in the same direction i.e. past x
increases cause future y increases (similarly for decreases). While, x −−→ y denotes that x
influences y in the opposite direction i.e. past x increases cause future y decreases and vice
versa.
Causality score: the number next to each causal relationship ascribed is the average
causal weight from x to y for the time period of 4th January 2000 to 12th February 2016 for
the specific causality method
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Table 8: Top 10 out of 600 Links in terms of strength throughout the time period examined for Linear
Cointegration and Nonlinear Cointegration
Rank Linear Cointegration Score Nonlinear Cointegration Score
1 10Y-German-bond→BOVESPA 0.7940
10Y-UK-bond −−→
2Y-USA-bond
-0.2899
2 10Y-UK-bond→BOVESPA 0.7899
HANGSENG→
BOVESPA 0.2547
3 2Y-Australian-bond→BOVESPA 0.7493
DOW JONES→
3Y- Italian -bond 0.2520
4 10Y-Swiss-bond→BOVESPA 0.7249
Oil→
SHANGHAI 0.2384
5 10Y-Australian-bond→BOVESPA 0.7208
NIKKEI225 −−→
2Y-USA-bond
-0.2384
6 10Y-USA-bond→BOVESPA 0.6937
10Y-UK-bond −−→
10Y-USA-bond
-0.2303
7 2Y-German-bond→BOVESPA 0.6924
NIKKEI225 −−→
2Y-German-bond
-0.2168
8 10Y-Japanese-bond→NIKKEI225 0.6815
10Y-USA-bond→
2Y-Japanese-bond 0.2046
9 2Y-USA-bond→BOVESPA 0.6747
DAX30→
3Y- Italian -bond 0.2018
10 10Y-Japanese-bond→BOVESPA 0.6667
10Y-Swiss-bond −−→
2to3Y-Spanish-bond
-0.1978
Causality symbols: x→y denotes that x influences y in the same direction i.e. past x
increases cause future y increases (similarly for decreases). While, x −−→ y denotes that x
influences y in the opposite direction i.e. past x increases cause future y decreases and vice
versa.
Causality score: the number next to each causal relationship ascribed is the average
causal weight from x to y for the time period of 4th January 2000 to 12th February 2016 for
the specific causality method
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Table 9: Top 10 out of 600 Links in terms of strength throughout the time period examined for Linear
Granger Causality and Nonlinear Granger Causality
Rank Linear GrangerCausality Score
Nonlinear Granger
Causality Score
1 3Y-Italian-bond→2to3Y-Spanish-bond 0.7940
10Y-Greek-bond→
2to3Y-Spanish-bond -0.2899
2 10Y-USA-bond→2to3Y-Spanish-bond 0.7899
3Y-Italian-bond→
2to3Y-Spanish-bond 0.2547
3 10Y-Greek-bond→2to3Y-Spanish-bond 0.7493
10Y-UK-bond→
2to3Y-Spanish-bond 0.2520
4 2Y-German-bond→2to3Y-Spanish-bond 0.7249
10Y-USA-bond→
2to3Y-Spanish-bond 0.2384
5 10Y-UK-bond→2to3Y-Spanish-bond 0.7208
10Y-USA-bond→
10Y-Australian-bond -0.2384
6 10Y-Italian-bond→2to3Y-Spanish-bond 0.6937
10Y-Italian-bond→
2to3Y-Spanish-bond -0.2303
7 10Y-USA-bond→10Y-Australian-bond 0.6924
2Y-German-bond→
2to3Y-Spanish-bond -0.2168
8 2Y-USA-bond→2to3Y-Spanish-bond 0.6815
2Y-USA-bond→
2to3Y-Spanish-bond 0.2046
9 DOW JONES→BSE 0.6747
10Y-USA-bond→
10Y-Japanese-bond 0.2018
10 10Y-Australian-bond→2to3Y-Spanish-bond 0.6667
10Y-Greek-bond→
10Y-German-bond -0.1978
Causality symbols: x→y denotes that x influences y in the same direction i.e. past x
increases cause future y increases (similarly for decreases). While, x −−→ y denotes that x
influences y in the opposite direction i.e. past x increases cause future y decreases and vice
versa.
Causality score: the number next to each causal relationship ascribed is the average
causal weight from x to y for the time period of 4th January 2000 to 12th February 2016 for
the specific causality method
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Table 10: Top 10 out of 600 Links in terms of strength throughout the time period examined for
Shadow Causality and Hidden Causality
Rank Shadow Causality Score Hidden Causality Score
1 DAX30→BSE 0.7940
10Y-USA-bond→
10Y-German-bond -0.2899
2 BSE→BOVESPA 0.7899
10Y-USA-bond→
10Y-Australian-bond 0.2547
3 BSE→S&P500 0.7493
10Y-Italian-bond→
10Y-German-bond 0.2520
4 BSE→Oil 0.7249
2Y-German-bond→
2to3Y-Spanish-bond 0.2384
5 CAC40→BSE 0.7208
10Y-UK-bond→
10Y-German-bond -0.2384
6 HANGSENG→BSE 0.6937
DOW JONES→
S&P500 -0.2303
7 BSE→ASX200 0.6924
10Y-Greek-bond→
10Y-Italian-bond -0.2168
8 BOVESPA→BSE 0.6815
2Y-Japanese-bond→
3Y- Italian -bond 0.2046
9 BSE→SHANGHAI 0.6747
10Y-UK-bond→
10Y-Swiss-bond 0.2018
10 DOW JONES→BSE 0.6667
10Y-German-bond→
10Y-Australian-bond -0.1978
Causality symbols: x→y denotes that x influences y in the same direction i.e. past x
increases cause future y increases (similarly for decreases). While, x −−→ y denotes that x
influences y in the opposite direction i.e. past x increases cause future y decreases and vice
versa.
Causality score: the number next to each causal relationship ascribed is the average
causal weight from x to y for the time period of 4th January 2000 to 12th February 2016 for
the specific causality method
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Table 11: Top 30 out of 600 Links in terms of averaged strength across all causalities
Rank Causal Relationship Rank Causal Relationship
1 10Y-USA-bond→2to3Y-Spanish-bond 16
10Y-Australian-bond→
2to3Y-Spanish-bond
2 10Y-Greek-bond→2to3Y-Spanish-bond 17
BOVESPA→
BSE
3 3Y-Italian-bond→2to3Y-Spanish-bond 18
2Y-Australian-bond→
2to3Y-Spanish-bond
4 10Y-USA-bond→10Y-Australian-bond 19
S&P500→
NIKKEI225
5 10Y-UK-bond→2to3Y-Spanish-bond 20
BOVESPA→
HANGSENG
6 10Y-Italian-bond→2to3Y-Spanish-bond 21
10Y-German-bond→
BOVESPA
7 2Y-USA-bond→2to3Y-Spanish-bond 22
10Y-Swiss-bond→
BOVESPA
8 2Y-German-bond→2to3Y-Spanish-bond 23
DOW JONES→
HANGSENG
9 10Y-USA-bond→10Y-German-bond 24
DAX30→
BSE
10 10Y-USA-bond→10Y-Japanese-bond 25
10Y-UK-bond→
BOVESPA
11 DOW JONES→BSE 26
2Y-Australian-bond→
BOVESPA
12 S&P500→HANGSENG 27
2Y-USA-bond→
10Y-Swiss-bond
13 10Y-USA-bond→10Y-Swiss-bond 28
2Y-German-bond→
BOVESPA
14 DOW JONES→NIKKEI225 29
BOVESPA→
SHANGHAI
15 10Y-Greek-bond→10Y-German-bond 30
CAC40→
BSE
Causality symbols: x→y denotes that x influences y in the same direction i.e. past x
increases cause future y increases (similarly for decreases). While, x −−→ y denotes that x
influences y in the opposite direction i.e. past x increases cause future y decreases and vice
versa.
Causality score: the number next to each causal relationship ascribed is the average
causal weight from x to y for the time period of 4th January 2000 to 12th February 2016 for
the specific causality method
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4.4 Causal System: One Attractor to pull them all
In order to rank the assets according to the causality they exert, we employ the out-strength
centrality and we average it over the years for every causality method. The complete rank-
ing lists can be seen in Table 12 , Table 13 and Table 14. As we can see the most causal asset
in terms of LICC is the USA 10 year−bond, while in terms of NICC the HANGSENG index.
Moreover, in terms of LCo the most causal asset is the Japanese 2 year−bond, while in terms
NCo it is DAX 30 index. LGC coincides with LICC in crowning the USA 10 year−bond as
the most causal one, which is again number one causal asset in terms of NGC. However,
results are different in terms of SC and HC giving BSE index and Japanese 2 year−bond re-
spectively as the most causal assets. All in all, the most causal asset in terms of all causalities
considered appears to be the USA 10 year−bond.
What is more, we could not but notice that, in agreement with Rahman et al (1997),
LCo along with HC unveil a “hidden” regime of causality occasionally monopolised by the
bonds (see Table 12 and Table 14) . This result is astounding because LCo attests that those
bonds bear the sceptres of linear and profound long-term influence on the other assets and
HC further reveals an active and consistent short-term causality exercised by those bonds.
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Table 12: Asset ranking in terms of out-strength centrality
LICC NICC LCo
Asset Strength Asset Strength Asset Strength
10Y USA bond 1.075 HANGSENG 0.871 2Y Japanese bond 1.377
DOW JONES 0.538 DAX 30 0.838 10Y Japanese bond 0.774
S&P 500 0.501 10Y Greek bond 0.830 10Y Swiss bond 0.529
10Y UK bond 0.501 10Y German bond 0.761 10Y UK bond 0.479
2Y USA bond 0.486 S&P 500 0.713 10Y German bond 0.472
BOVESPA 0.416 NIKKEI 225 0.585 2Y German bond 0.464
10Y Greek bond 0.407 10Y Italian bond 0.521 10Y Greek bond 0.410
CAC 40 0.396 CAC 40 0.496 2Y Australian bond 0.393
DAX 30 0.391 10Y Swiss bond 0.383 10Y Australian bond 0.379
3Y Italian bond 0.223 2Y German bond 0.315 10Y USA bond 0.377
2Y Australian bond 0.222 10Y USA bond 0.302 10Y Italian bond 0.370
OIL 0.202 2TO3Y Spanish bond 0.299 2Y USA bond 0.314
10Y Japanese bond 0.185 10Y Australian bond 0.284 3Y Italian bond 0.311
10Y German bond 0.177 DOW JONES 0.282 2to3Y Spanish bond 0.163
BSE 0.170 BSE 0.282 OIL 0.021
2Y German bond 0.169 ASX 200 0.278 SHANGHAI 0.000
SHANGHAI 0.169 BOVESPA 0.262 BOVESPA 0.000
ASX 200 0.160 OIL 0.225 DOW JONES 0.000
10Y Swiss bond 0.145 2Y USA bond 0.186 S&P 500 0.000
10Y Italian bond 0.142 10Y Japanese bond 0.181 DAX 30 0.000
10Y Australian bond 0.137 3Y Italian bond 0.138 HANGSENG 0.000
HANGSENG 0.122 SHANGHAI 0.096 CAC 40 0.000
2Y Japanese bond 0.105 10Y UK bond 0.077 NIKKEI 225 0.000
NIKKEI 225 0.080 2Y Japanese bond 0.076 ASX 200 0.000
2to3Y Spenish bond 0.066 2Y Australian bond 0.059 BSE 0.000
LICC: Linear Intertemporal Cross Correlation, NICC: Nonlinear Intertemporal Cross
Correlation, LCo: Linear Cointegration
Score: Out Strength Centrality is calculated as the average for every node (asset) through-
out the period of 4th January 2000 to 12th February 2016 for the specific causality method
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Table 13: Asset ranking in terms of out-strength centrality
NCo LGC NGC
Asset Strength Asset Strength Asset Strength
DAX 30 0.637 10Y USA bond 2.429 10Y USA bond 2.098
NIKKEI 225 0.543 S&P 500 1.352 10Y Greek bond 1.480
10Y USA bond 0.440 2Y USA bond 1.267 10Y Swiss bond 1.242
10Y UK bond 0.440 DOW JONES 1.220 DOW JONES 1.195
OIL 0.410 HANGSENG 1.146 2Y USA bond 1.193
3Y Italian bond 0.356 DAX 30 1.122 BOVESPA 1.093
CAC 40 0.324 BOVESPA 1.115 HANGSENG 1.024
2Y Australian bond 0.322 10Y UK bond 1.115 DAX 30 1.021
2Y German bond 0.319 3Y Italian bond 1.047 S&P 500 0.992
DOW JONES 0.306 10Y Greek bond 1.024 10Y UK bond 0.951
2Y USA bond 0.276 2Y German bond 0.835 3Y Italian bond 0.940
BSE 0.273 CAC 40 0.823 OIL 0.920
HANGSENG 0.263 10Y Japanese bond 0.821 10Y Italian bond 0.824
ASX 200 0.251 SHANGHAI 0.811 2to3Y Spanish bond 0.821
SHANGHAI 0.249 2Y Australian bond 0.786 ASX 200 0.815
S&P 500 0.245 10Y Italian bond 0.771 NIKKEI 225 0.808
10Y German bond 0.234 OIL 0.746 10Y Japanese bond 0.705
10Y Australian bond 0.229 BSE 0.729 CAC 40 0.699
10Y Greek bond 0.222 ASX 200 0.728 2Y German bond 0.698
10Y Swiss bond 0.210 10Y Australian bond 0.700 2Y Japanese bond 0.693
10Y Japanese bond 0.200 10Y Swiss bond 0.650 SHANGHAI 0.685
10Y Italian bond 0.174 2Y Japanese bond 0.642 10Y Australian bond 0.678
BOVESPA 0.148 10Y German bond 0.512 BSE 0.675
2to3Y Spanish bond 0.110 NIKKEI 225 0.488 2Y Australian bond 0.521
2Y Japanese bond 0.107 2to3Y Spanish bond 0.460 10Y German bond 0.427
NCo: Nonlinear Cointegration, LGC: Linear Granger Causality, NGC: Nonlinear Granger
Causality
Score: Out Strength Centrality is calculated as the average for every node (asset) through-
out the period of 4th January 2000 to 12th February 2016 for the specific causality method
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Table 14: Asset ranking in terms of out-strength centrality
SC HC Total(mean)
Asset Strength Asset Strength Asset Strength
BSE 1.150 2Y Japanese bond 0.423 10Y USA bond 0.904
SHANGHAI 0.486 10Y USA bond 0.346 10Y Greek bond 0.630
10Y Greek bond 0.458 2Y German bond 0.257 DAX 30 0.542
S&P 500 0.399 10Y UK bond 0.241 S&P 500 0.540
DOW JONES 0.342 2Y USA bond 0.215 2Y USA bond 0.516
2Y JPN bond 0.323 10Y Greek bond 0.208 DOW JONES 0.507
BOVESPA 0.307 DOW JONES 0.174 10Y UK bond 0.505
ASX 200 0.280 2Y Australian bond 0.156 2Y Japnese bond 0.468
2Y German bond 0.262 10Y Australian bond 0.152 HANGSENG 0.458
CAC 40 0.259 10Y Italian bond 0.140 BOVESPA 0.430
10Y UK bond 0.234 S&P 500 0.121 10Y Swiss bond 0.422
DAX 30 0.225 10Y German bond 0.113 BSE 0.415
10Y Italian bond 0.214 DAX 30 0.100 2Y German bond 0.415
HANGSENG 0.201 BOVESPA 0.099 3Y Italian bond 0.409
NIKKEI 225 0.200 SHANGHAI 0.074 10Y Italian bond 0.395
10Y Australian bond 0.200 3Y Italian bond 0.068 10Y Japanese bond 0.384
OIL 0.195 10Y Swiss bond 0.048 CAC 40 0.379
3Y Italian bond 0.190 BSE 0.040 10Y German bond 0.360
2Y USA bond 0.188 NIKKEI 225 0.039 10Y Australian bond 0.345
10Y German bond 0.184 HANGSENG 0.038 OIL 0.343
2Y Australian bond 0.179 CAC 40 0.034 NIKKEI 225 0.343
10Y Japanese bond 0.176 ASX 200 0.031 2Y Australian bond 0.330
10Y Swiss bond 0.173 10Y Japanese bond 0.028 SHANGHAI 0.321
2to3Y Spanish bond 0.173 OIL 0.024 ASX 200 0.318
10Y USA bond 0.165 2to3Y Spanish bond 0.020 2to3Y Spanish bond 0.264
SC: Shadow Causality, HC: Hidden Causality
Score: Out Strength Centrality is calculated as the average for every node (asset) through-
out the period of 4th January 2000 to 12th February 2016 for the specific causality method
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4.5 Network Visualization
The extraordinary performance of the sovereign bonds led us to further examine our finan-
cial network’s evolutionary behavior for each of the eight causality methods. To that end, we
plot four phases of the network for every causality method (see Figures 9 to 16). The phases
are recording a) 2002 during the post-Dotcom bubble burst, b) 2008 during the global finan-
cial meltdown, c) 2011 during the aftermath of the global crisis and d) 2015 at the heart of
the Chinese stock market crash.
On the onset of the LICC network (see Figure 9 a), we can observe that the 2Y−USA−bond
is the predominant hub of causality with the only competitive equity indices being those of
DAX 30 and CAC 40. During the global financial crisis, 2Y−USA−bond concedes its central
role to the 10Y−USA−bond while the overall equities performance remained stable. Five
years after the outbreak of the global crisis 10Y−USA−bond still exerts the most causality
in the network (see Figure 9 c), however its strength is diminished (see Figure 9 d). As far
as the equities are concerned ASX 200 appears to be the most influential. Ultimately, dur-
ing the Chinese stock market crisis it is really interesting to see that Oil becomes a hub of
causality.
Figure 9 a: Linear Intertemporal Cross Correlation network during the post-Dotcom bubble
burst. Node Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to
the causality intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according
to legend in each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category
in terms of network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds
and grey for oil.)
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Figure 9 b: Linear Intertemporal Cross Correlation network during the global financial cri-
sis. Node Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to
the causality intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according
to legend in each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category
in terms of network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds
and grey for oil.)
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Figure 9 c: Linear Intertemporal Cross Correlation network after the global financial crisis.
Node Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the
causality intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to
legend in each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in
terms of network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds
and grey for oil.)
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Figure 9 d: Linear Intertemporal Cross Correlation network during the Chinese stock mar-
ket crash. Node Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: anal-
ogous to the causality intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category
according to legend in each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset
category in terms of network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used
for bonds and grey for oil.)
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Viewing the same financial network through the lens of NICC (see Figures 10) we wit-
ness a totally different situation: A disconnected network with substantially weaker rela-
tionships and no apparent hubs in all four phases. Contrary to the case of LICC here we see
little interaction among assets of different category (equities and bonds). The only similarity
appears to be the rising importance of Oil as a key node during the Chinese stock market
crash. Overall we observe that LICC produced more stable relationships than NICC, how-
ever this does not necessarily mean that LICC is better, it could as well mean that LICC,
being a linear method, overestimated the causality intensity, while NICC as a more “ex-
plorative” nonlinear method is stricter in assigning higher scores. This whole association
between causality methods and their “meaning” is already part of our future work.
Figure 10 a: Nonlinear Intertemporal Cross Correlation network during the post-Dotcom
bubble burst. Node Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: anal-
ogous to the causality intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category
according to legend in each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset
category in terms of network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used
for bonds and grey for oil.)
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Figure 10 b: Nonlinear Intertemporal Cross Correlation network during the global financial
crisis. Node Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to
the causality intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according
to legend in each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category
in terms of network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds
and grey for oil.)
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Figure 10 c: Nonlinear Intertemporal Cross Correlation network after the global financial
crisis. Node Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to
the causality intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according
to legend in each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category
in terms of network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds
and grey for oil.)
4 CAUSALITY NETWORK ANALYTICS 42
Figure 10 d: Nonlinear Intertemporal Cross Correlation network during the Chinese stock
market crash. Node Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: anal-
ogous to the causality intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category
according to legend in each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset
category in terms of network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used
for bonds and grey for oil.)
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Enter LCo in Figures 11. Here we clearly see the reign of bonds throughout the four phases,
with almost all of the linear long-term relationships being initiated from the bonds. Clearly,
the equities subgroup is totally broken with the individual equities being strongly influ-
enced of bonds. Noteworthy enough, the 2Y−Japanese−bond is the hub of the financial net-
work especially in Figures 11 a, 11 c where it is obvious that it influences the majority of the
equities.
Figure 11 a: Linear Cointegration network during the post-Dotcom bubble burst. Node
Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality
intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in
each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of
network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey
for oil.)
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Figure 11 b: Linear Cointegration network during the global financial crisis. Node Size:
analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality
intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in
each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of
network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey
for oil.)
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Figure 11 c: Linear Cointegration network after the global financial crisis. Node Size: analo-
gous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality intensity.
Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in each plot)
Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of network
area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey for oil.)
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Figure 11 d: Linear Cointegration network during the Chinese stock market crash. Node
Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality
intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in
each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of
network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey
for oil.)
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In the nonlinear form of cointegration network (NCo) bonds still have a stronger pres-
ence than equities (see Figures 12). During the aftermath of the Dotcom bubble burst the
network appears quite mixed, with causal relationships between equities and bonds being
formed interchangeably. BSE appears to be the most influential equity and 2Y−USA−bond
the most central bond. Into the global crisis, the netwrok appears slighlty more structured,
with the leading asset role of equities being handed over to DAX 30, and the stength of
2Y−USA−bond somewhat undermined. After the crisis, 2Y−USA−bond, is replaced by the
3Y−Italian−bond as the leading bond, and DAX 30 stands on par with it (see Figure 12 c).
Finally, when the Chinese stock market crash takes place no evident hub is observed. How-
ever the subgroup of bonds is significantly more strongly connected than the subgoup of
equities which appears rather scattered.
Figure 12 a: Nonlinear Cointegration network during the post-Dotcom bubble burst. Node
Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality
intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in
each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of
network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey
for oil.)
4 CAUSALITY NETWORK ANALYTICS 48
Figure 12 b: Nonlinear Cointegration network during the global financial crisis. Node Size:
analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality
intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in
each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of
network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey
for oil.)
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Figure 12 c: Nonlinear Cointegration network after the global financial crisis. Node Size:
analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality
intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in
each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of
network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey
for oil.)
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Figure 12 d: Nonlinear Cointegration network during the Chinese stock market crash. Node
Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality
intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in
each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of
network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey
for oil.)
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LGC produces a financial network that during the post-Dotcom bubble burst (see Figure
13 a) reveals a strong cluster of bonds and two broken groups of equities. However, during
the global financial crisis (see Figure 13 b) the equities form a clustered group and in fact
outperform the disconnected bonds team. DowJones, BSE and BOVESPA exerted the most
causality during that period. After the global financial crisis what we see is a strong presence
of bonds with dominant presence of the 10Y−UK−bond and the 2Y−USA−bond. As far as
the equities are concerned HANGSENG appears to be quite central (see Figure 13 c). In
the Chinese stock market crash, a recurring pattern of rising Oil importance is visible (see
Figure 13 d), while equities and bonds appear to share in almost equal terms the causality
flowing in the network.
Figure 13 a: Linear Granger Causality network during the post-Dotcom bubble burst. Node
Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality
intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in
each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of
network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey
for oil.)
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Figure 13 b: Linear Granger Causality network during the global financial crisis. Node Size:
analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality
intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in
each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of
network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey
for oil.)
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Figure 13 c: Linear Granger Causality network after the global financial crisis. Node Size:
analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality
intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in
each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of
network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey
for oil.)
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Figure 13 d: Linear Granger Causality network during the Chinese stock market crash.
Node Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the
causality intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to
legend in each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in
terms of network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds
and grey for oil.)
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NGC appears to evolve in a parallel manner (see Figures 14) as that of LGC, no wonder
given that those processes are quite similar. The only significant difference seems to occur
during the global financial crisis. Contrary to the LGC case here we can see a very strong
cluster of bonds with immense centrality, and on the opposite side an equities subgroup
divided in three with DowJones as the stronget index. Again, Oil rises in significance during
the Chinese stock market crash (see Figure 14 d).
Figure 14 a: Nonlinear Granger Causality network during the post-Dotcom bubble burst.
Node Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the
causality intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to
legend in each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in
terms of network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds
and grey for oil.)
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Figure 14 b: Nonlinear Granger Causality network during the global financial crisis. Node
Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality
intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in
each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of
network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey
for oil.)
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Figure 14 c: Nonlinear Granger Causality network after the global financial crisis. Node
Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality
intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in
each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of
network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey
for oil.)
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Figure 14 d: Nonlinear Granger Causality network during the Chinese stock market crash.
Node Size: analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the
causality intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to
legend in each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in
terms of network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds
and grey for oil.)
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Quite intriguing is the newtork as seen through SC (see Figures 15). During the post-
Dotcom bubble burst we oberve an absolute balance between the equities and bonds, with
Oil lying in the middle of the network. When the global financial crisis breaks out, the
3Y−Italian−bond (see Figure 15 b) polarises the financial network and renders the equities
team disconnected. In the aftermath of the crisis, the 10Y−Greek−bond stands as the hub
of the financial network (Figure 15 c). After four years, and into the Chinese stock market
crash, the network appears quite clustered (see Figure 15 d) with equities and bonds having
trivial and few interactions.
Figure 15 a: Shadow Causality network during the post-Dotcom bubble burst. Node Size:
analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality
intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in
each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of
network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey
for oil.)
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Figure 15 b: Shadow Causality network during the global financial crisis. Node Size: analo-
gous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality intensity.
Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in each plot)
Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of network
area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey for oil.)
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Figure 15 c: Shadow Causality network after the global financial crisis. Node Size: analo-
gous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality intensity.
Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in each plot)
Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of network
area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey for oil.)
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Figure 15 d: Shadow Causality network during the Chinese stock market crash. Node Size:
analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality
intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in
each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of
network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey
for oil.)
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The last prism in our analysis (HC) further consolidates the existence of a bonds regime
(see Figures 16). In the post-Dotcom bubble burst SHANGHAI index with a group of
other equities are causally affected by the bonds cluster. The bonds cluster is mostly led
by 3Y−Italian−bond and 10Y−German−bond (see Figure 16 a). During the global financial
crisis the equities group seems further scattered, while on the other hand bonds seem to be
connected with even stronger causality relationships (see Figure 16 b). In the post-mortem
of the global financial crisis the 10Y−USA−bond, 2Y−USA−bond and 10Y−UK−bond appear
to concentrate the majority of causal relationships. Ultimately, during the Chinese stock
market crash we can see a network saturated absolutely by the bonds, with 10Y−German
−bond and 10Y−Greek−bond being the undisputed hubs.
Figure 16 a: Hidden Causality network during the post-Dotcom bubble burst. Node Size:
analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality
intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in
each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of
network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey
for oil.)
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Figure 16 b: Hidden Causality network during the global financial crisis. Node Size: analo-
gous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality intensity.
Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in each plot)
Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of network
area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey for oil.)
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Figure 16 c: Hidden Causality network after the global financial crisis. Node Size: analo-
gous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality intensity.
Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in each plot)
Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of network
area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey for oil.)
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Figure 16 d: Hidden Causality network during the Chinese stock market crash. Node Size:
analogous to the node’s out-strength centrality. Link Width: analogous to the causality
intensity. Link Color: denotes the causality’s origin (node category according to legend in
each plot) Colored area: helps understand visually the dominant asset category in terms of
network area (light orange-red for equities, light yellow-green is used for bonds and grey
for oil.)
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5 Conclusion
Our results ascertain the existence of causal behavior among financial assets throughout the
time period examined, with varying intensity according to the period under scrutiny. This
outcome challenges the strongly supported theory of Efficient Market Hypothesis at least
its strong form and opens new horizons for further analysis on market inefficiencies. We
tested the similarity percentage of common links among all causality methods and found
that the most similar pair of causality-induced network is on average less than 50% simi-
lar throughout the time period examined. Thus we consider it meaningless to try to com-
pare results among different causality methods, every method deserves an explanation of
their own. However, to our knowledge, our study is the first attempt to try and unify vari-
ous causalities for the production and analysis of financial networks. Thirdly, we ranked
the causal links as produced by each causality method and we found that the most in-
tense and protracted relationship across all causality methods is that of 10Y−USA−bond →
(causing the prices o f ) 2to3Y−Spanish−bond. Furthermore, we ranked the financial assets in
terms of averaged causality emanation, and we uncovered a hidden “bonds regime” with
the most causal asset being that of USA 10 year−bond. Ultimately we observe a recurring
pattern of Oil rising in terms of causality exertion as the financial network enters the Chi-
nese stock market crash. Causalities cannot be used for forecasting asset prices directly,
rather they are tools to detect causal relationships, and help in the modelling design pro-
cess. Our future work will involve the use of causal networks as a basis for the scope of
modelling and forecasting asset prices.
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